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NATURE OR HUMANITY: 
BETWEEN GENES AND 
VALUES] 
[ABSTRACT] 
 [We are within nature and culture, conditioned simultaneously by genes and 
meanings. This form of our self-understanding is the result of fundamental 
modifications that happened in modern philosophical anthropology and of 
the impact of the natural Science. In modern philosophy three types of 
approaches to the human situation were constituted at different times: the 
idealist, the naturalist, and the culturalist, and the problem of whether 
humanity is natural (biological) or cultural has begun to take precedence over 
the issue of human supernatural roots. Both approaches are presented, their 
presuppositions discussed, and arguments in favor of a version of the 
culturalist approach. Only the culturalist approach allows us to understand 
our own self-constitution and, in particular, our self-reflectivity, as well as the 
naturalist attempts to ignore them and immerse ourselves in nature]. 
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To be between genes and values is our human condition. This means 
that we are between nature and culture or rather within both, i.e., within the 
sphere of natural phenomena and the sphere of meanings, or some 
naturalists prefer to say in the field of gene-culture co-evolution. This way of 
conceiving the human situation, this form of our self-understanding is the 
result of fundamental modifications in philosophical anthropology and the 
impact of the natural sciences. Let me briefly discuss these modifications. 
In ancient philosophy the problem of human nature was 
a philosophical issue that arose within the context of our knowledge about 
the Cosmos, i.e., the universal order connecting Logos, the laws of nature, 
and human fate. From our contemporary perspective it is clear that in ancient 
philosophy it was not a question for the natural scientist, who aims at 
founding humanity within nature, or a question for the social scientist, who 
tries to understand man as a sociocultural and historical being. Nor was it 
a question for the ethicist of Kantian persuasion, who wants to understand 
man as a moral subject acting in the reign of freedom. It was an issue of the 
philosopher, the lover of wisdom as a whole, not wisdom divided into 
disciplines. However, since ancient philosophy conceptualized the separation 
                                               
1 The text is based on my Introduction [Tuchańska 1992]. 
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of necessary, eternal, and unchangeable being, on the one hand, and 
contingent, finite, and mutable phenomena, on the other hand, it divided the 
problem of human nature into the empirical question of the genetic and 
functional determination of man within the realm of phenomena, and the 
metaphysical (later also theological) problem of the ideal humanity. The 
answer to the latter question requires prior knowledge about being, i.e., the 
absolute reality that conditions and gives sense to any contingent being. “To 
know properly what it is to be contingent in a metaphysical sense we have to 
know what it is to be non-contingent, thus to know what God is” [Kołakowski 
1982, 70]. Any answer to the metaphysical problem of humanity follows from 
the presupposed idea of God and the belief that human beings are akin to 
God [Scheler 1976, sec. 2]. Plato’s conception illustrates this: someone who 
knows the idea of Goodness, Truth, and Beauty understands man as a subject 
of moral, cognitive, and artistic acts. Human nature belongs to the ideal order 
and it bestows reality upon every human being that belongs to the order of 
empirical objects. However, the gap between perfect eternal being and 
contingent things does not mean that the philosopher can concentrate either 
on ideal humanity or on empirical subjects. To study the first without 
knowing the second would destroy philosophy as human wisdom; to become 
familiar with the second without knowing the first would not give us wisdom. 
One can become a sage, who understands things, is able to de-mystify 
spurious truths, and may rule a kingdom, only if one relates the empirical 
world of natural and social phenomena to the ideal world.  
The basic structure of this ancient construction was inherited and 
developed by Medieval philosophers. For St. Augustine it is self-evident that 
our experience of God as eternal Immutability, Light, and Happiness gives us 
a fundamental truth about ourselves. Our wandering within the factual realm 
of nature and history is not constitutive for our human nature. Quite the 
contrary; our presence among material things is the source of a permanent 
menace to our humanity. To be a human being is like a task, a call to duty 
that everyone has to fulfill, fighting against empirical reality and its 
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temptations. We can know our human nature only through insight into the 
realm of intentions and ideas of God. This insight, however, allows us to 
realize that man is not simply a soul, whose embodiment can be ignored 
without distorting the essence of man. Man is unavoidably a soul invested 
with bodily form or — to reverse the order — a living being incarnating 
a spirit. Man belongs simultaneously to the ideal and the empirical order, 
although humanity is constituted only within the ideal order.  
 
2. Modern views: human nature versus humanity 
 
In modern philosophy, the idealist, the naturalist, and the culturalist 
approaches were constituted at different times.2 Descartes and his 
seventeenth century followers established the idealist reading of the nature 
of man, in the eighteenth century the thinkers of the French Enlightenment 
created the boldest version of the naturalist interpretation, and certain 
thinkers within German nineteenth-century philosophy established the 
culturalist interpretation. 
Descartes did not reject the most evident belief of common sense that 
we are the unity of body and mind, of extension and thinking. Yet he 
demonstrated that common sense should and could be overcome in order to 
discover the truth of human nature. He believed — following traditional 
metaphysicians — that the essence of human beings is not located within 
empirical reality. Yet, his way of overcoming commonsensical ways of 
considering human nature was not metaphysical but epistemological. For 
him, humanity is located in an act of human self-awareness: it realizes itself in 
our rational self-identification. In other words, to be a human being is to 
engage in an act of self-awareness — cogito. Humanity exists in the order of 
pure thinking, which we can uncover only when we entirely neglect the 
                                               
2 The term “anthropology” was coined in 1501 by Magnus Hundt and defined in 1594 by Otto 
Casmann as “the doctrine of human nature” [Stagl 2000, 33]. 
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sphere of bodies and empirical phenomena. The core of the Cartesian 
construction is the idea that in the course of my conceptual self-reflection I 
am given to myself directly as a substance, whose activity — in fact, the only 
activity — is thinking, broadly understood. A human being comes into 
existence primarily within the ideal order of (self-)thinking, within which I 
reconstruct — in virtue of my own intellectual activity — first, my subjective 
existence, i.e., my existence-for-myself, and second, my objective existence, 
i.e., my existence as a soul created by God, as res cogitans, and as res extensa 
entangled in natural mechanisms and dependencies. Therefore, all forms of 
my objective existence: as God’s creature, as a subject of cognition 
confronted with an independent object of cognition, a physical body, a living 
being, etc., should be seen — from a philosophical perspective — as 
correlatives of human self-consciousness. I would not be able to understand 
myself as a God’s creature or an animal without my ability to think, which is 
— first and foremost — my ability to think-about-myself. My faculty to think 
about myself is really my ability of thinking-myself. 
Naturalists — from Democritus, Epicurus, Hobbes, and La Mettrie to 
modern vitalists and contemporary evolutionary naturalists — have been 
motivated by a belief that their theories could overcome the metaphysical 
separation of phenomena from essences, on the grounds that there are no 
essences. Presupposing that the natural order is neither a reflection nor an 
embodiment of a supernatural order, modern naturalists claim that the 
question of humanity as distinguished from the characteristics of the human 
species does not make any sense. Thus, they reject the question of the 
supernatural roots of humanity. For (early)modern naturalists, humanity is a 
purely natural phenomenon, i.e., it is produced by nature and located within 
the global mechanism of nature. In contemporary naturalism this view has 
been substantially modified by developments in the biological sciences. For 
contemporary naturalists, humanity is a particular form of animality 
constituted during the process of biological evolution but — simultaneously 
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— culturally shaped, polished, and perfected or — on the contrary — 
deformed and corrupted. 
Without any unjust exaggeration, one can say that in the nineteenth 
century the pressure of biological and historical facts, which had been just 
discovered, together with the inherited philosophical program of 
transcendentalism modified deeply the entire continuum of views referring 
to human beings and human nature, from the metaphysical to the 
theological, from the rationalist to the naturalist. Whether these views 
referred to the characteristics of the human species, to Reason, or to 
a created soul, they had to recognize the natural genesis of humankind and 
the sociohistorical aspect of humanity. In German idealism, reason, ethical 
norms, and self-reflectivity became entangled in the historical development 
of humanity. Later, reacting against Hegel, philosophers of different 
persuasion — from Feuerbach and Marx, to Scheler, Plessner, and Cassirer — 
“attempted to build bridges between empirical description of being human as 
part of nature and intuitive knowledge of being human as free spiritual 
activity” ([Smith 2007, 42]; [Cassirer 1978]; [Plessner 1983]; [Scheler 1955]). 
One of the consequences of these radical changes was the emergence 
of a question: how does the natural relate to the sociocultural? Are human 
beings fundamentally natural or cultural? Is human nature constituted by 
biological factors (genes, natural selection, etc.), and in this sense universal, 
or rather by meanings and values and, therefore, radically cultural and 
historical in character? Are we determined by physical and biological forces 
primarily, and by psychological and social factors only secondary; or is the 
natural only a basis upon which our humanity is created in virtue of human 
sociocultural and historical activity; or — even more radically — are we, our 
sociohistorical order and our nature, constructed by ourselves? It seems that 
the problem of whether humanity is natural (biological) or cultural begins to 
take precedence over the issue of human supernatural roots. 
Some of the contemporary naturalist approaches to humanity claim 
that they supply the psychological and sociocultural views of human beings 
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with a deeper, more fundamental truth. Such is the case in Freud’s 
psychoanalysis, ethology, sociobiology, and some views within neuroscience, 
philosophy of mind, and post-humanism. Their claim, however, is 
fundamentally flawed. As Max Scheler states, to say that humanity develops 
from animality is to utter nonsense, because from the perspective of the 
biological sciences we are and remain animals, not humans. What allows us 
to contrast a human being — as a new being, a new quality — with an animal 
being does not lie in animality itself [Scheler 1955, sec. 3]. Another source of 
difficulty for the contemporary biological approach to human nature is the 
clash between the essence of Darwin’s achievement and the commonality of 
human nature postulated by theoreticians. As Ernst Mayr emphasizes, his 
theory of evolution “undermined essentialism” and “focused attention on the 
role of individual” [Mayr 1982, 249]. “The central insight of Darwin’s vision of 
nature was the diversity of species and of individuals within a species, not the 
existence of an essential core of particular characteristics” [Smith 2007, 28]. 
On the other hand, contemporary adherents of the naturalist view of human 
nature seem to share with theologians and philosophers the view that human 
nature is defined by certain universals [Shore 2000, 81–82].  
The drawbacks and consequences of the radical reductionist 
naturalization of humanity have been studied and criticized most profoundly 
with respect to psychoanalysis. Sociobiology raised similar polemics. It was 
charged with reductionism, genetic determinism, with spreading all sorts of 
racial, sexist, and class prejudices, and finally — with approaching the social 
reality in a dilettantish way (cf.: [Laland, Brown 2011, 65–72]). For Edward 
Wilson, human nature — in all its aspects, including the spiritual, ethical, and 
social — is simply the differentiam specificam of the human species, and is 
caused by genes that are unique to the human species. In its early stage, 
sociobiology’s claim was not only that it had the right to explain human 
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phenomena, but also that it was able to offer their ultimate explanation.3 
However, arguments and empirical data forced sociobiologists to weaken 
their claim: genes do not determine particular ways of behaving but only 
multiple alternatives of behavior, and the actualization of a particular 
behavior is triggered by non-genetic factors, in particular, sociocultural ones. 
Thus, advocates of a moderate version of sociobiology claim that sociobiology 
does not (and cannot) eliminate and replace the social, historical, and cultural 
sciences, but that it is able to contribute to the explanation of human 
behavior, social institutions, and cultural phenomena. However, it not only 
extends the knowledge elaborated by the humanities; it offers us an 
explanation that is more fundamental because biological phenomena and 
processes constitute the foundation of sociocultural reality. In this way 
sociobiology can unify the social sciences [Degler 1991, 310–327]. 
The position of Konrad Lorenz and his ethology is similar, although the 
reductionist charge would be even more unfair than in the case of Wilson. 
For Lorenz, the entirety of being can be described with the help of one 
conceptual apparatus that is developed from the categories of the theory of 
evolution. Although the sphere of culture is — for Lorenz — a relatively 
autonomous and isolated level of being, it is the result of human instincts and 
impulses. All our actions are adaptive; our pro-social behavior, e.g., acts of 
altruism, love, or friendship, are based on instincts. Even artistic creativeness, 
appreciation of beauty, or cognitive curiosity stem from “instinctive behavior 
mechanisms” [Lorenz 1966, 236–248]. Every cultural phenomenon is a factor 
that complements instinctive mechanisms in human adaptation to the 
environment. “The equipment of man with phylogenetically programmed 
                                               
3 Today brain scientists and philosophers of mind claim the same. Many of them “have 
declared clearly and emphatically that there is no separate mental stuff” and “that 
knowledge of brain events explains what goes on when people experience or act.” Some 
“treat ‘mind’ as the generic term for a number of brain functions” [Smith 2007, 108]. All such 
declarations downplay or ignore the social and cultural dimensions of human consciousness, 
self-reflection, and knowledge [Ibidem, 111–112]. 
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norms of behavior is just as dependent on cultural tradition and rational 
responsibility as, conversely, the function of both the latter is dependent on 
instinctual motivation” [Lorenz 1966, 265]. 
Naturalist ways of explaining human behavior, psychological 
mechanisms, or human cultural traits seem attractive and very convincing to 
many people. In the twentieth century they obtained both popularity and 
intensive criticism in different fields of the humanities (e.g., explanations 
mobilizing heredity, instincts, race, or sex differences in psychology; the 
reference to the biological concept of human nature or to evolutionary 
mechanisms in cultural and social anthropology, as well as to ethology and 
sociobiology in social, anthropological, and political studies).4 They gain 
importance again in new (neuroscientific) naturalism and post-humanism. 
Sociobiology and ethology were replaced by interdisciplinary fields of 
research: human behavioral ecology, evolutionary psychology, cultural 
evolution theory, and gene-culture co-evolution models. In these new 
evolutionary approaches to human mind, behavior, and culture much more 
emphasis is put on the interrelationship between genetic, ecological, and 
sociocultural conditioning, the parallels between biological and cultural 
evolution, and the correlations or even mutual dependencies between 
genetic and cultural evolutionary changes. In spite of all those changes, what 
is common to all these evolutionary perspectives is understanding humans as 
“sophisticated animals,” at best “guided by genetic and cultural information,” 
and to consider human behavior as usually and essentially adaptive ([Laland, 
Brown 2011, 211]; italics added — B. T.). The persuasive power of naturalist 
explanations is probably connected with their scientific stigma: they must be 
right because they belong to natural science that provides the truth.  
There are, however, three issues which must be taken into 
consideration by a philosophical analysis juxtaposing naturalist and humanist 
approaches to humans. First is connected with difficulties in merging the 
                                               
4 For details see: [Degler 1991]. 
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vocabulary of the evolutionary theory and that of the humanities or social 
sciences. Second issue is the difference between explanation of human 
features, in particular genetic or genealogical explanations, and 
understanding who we are or what constitutes us as humans. Third issue is 
the unavoidability of philosophical presuppositions in both naturalist 
(scientific) and non-naturalist approaches. In order to tackle the first issue, let 
me consider three examples and begin from sociobiology.  
Someone who says that sociobiology complements traditional 
sociological studies of social phenomena tacitly presupposes that the 
question of what is described and explained by the united forces of sociology 
and sociobiology is unanimously decided and accepted by both parties. 
Usually however, this is not the case. There is no agreement between 
sociologists or cultural anthropologists and sociobiologists as to the 
definitions of the phenomena studied by both disciplines. Moreover, it is 
quite possible that agreement will be never achieved and that it cannot be 
achieved without the complete subordination of the social concepts under 
biological ones.  
For instance, in sociobiology human aggression can be defined as an 
individual physical act (or a threat of an act) that limits the freedom of 
another individual’s behavior, or the fitness of another individual, that is, its 
ability to transfer genes [Urbaniak 1984, 167]. In sociology or cultural 
anthropology, on the other hand, the basis for identifying an act as aggressive 
is not the threat to individual fitness, or the presence of a gene of aggression, 
or any other natural factor. In these disciplines it is necessary to make 
reference to historical systems of meanings, rules of interpreting behavior, 
moral norms, religious beliefs, or legal regulations. Only by relating a given 
behavior to these cultural systems of meanings and values we can distinguish 
an act of aggression from the ritual offering of human life to a deity, the 
killing of an enemy during a battle, or the inflicting of capital punishment on 
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someone. For sociobiology all these acts are simply cases of aggressive 
behavior.5  
Another example is the statement by Justin Stagl that human nature 
has “four layers which have had time to interpenetrate and to intermingle 
their flavours”: the biological heritage of the species Homo sapiens, the 
cultural heritage of mankind, particular traditions within humanity, and the 
utopian potential of humanity [Stagl 2000, 34–5]. Its understanding requires 
interconnected definitions of “species Homo sapiens,” “mankind,” and 
“humanity,” in which the two latter concepts would not be reduced to the 
first one. It also requires a clear notion of the interpenetration between the 
biological heritage of the species Homo sapiens and the cultural heritage of 
mankind. And finally, two concepts “biological heritage” and “social heritage” 
should be merged carefully since the term “inheritance” does not have 
(entirely) compatible meanings in genetics and in the human sciences. In 
genetics the concept of heritability “relates exclusively to those genetic 
influences that are transmitted from the parents and affect the response to 
selection” [Laland, Brown 2011, 183, footnote 6]. In the human sciences 
heritability refers almost to anything, from patterns of behavior, preferences, 
norms, opinions, knowledge, to rights, titles, and properties received by 
succession, by will or gift, but also by all forms of enculturation. Moreover, 
inheritance binds not only parents and offspring but also generations or 
siblings transmitting outgrown clothes from one to another.  
                                               
5 Similar remark was made by Joseph Fracchia and Richard Lewontin in reference to two 
culturally different “acts of barbarism in Western history”: the genocide of Native Americans 
and the Nazi Holocaust. Cultural evolutionists “may subject both to the same explanatory 
principle as just two examples of human aggression explained through some selectionist 
variation or combination of inclusive fitness, innate aggression, the stress of overpopulation, 
and/or the need for Lebensraum.” Such an explanation would, however, “lead to a gross 
misunderstanding of each and would tell us little about their historically and politically 
significant differences” [Fracchia, Lewontin 1999, 77]. 
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Similarly, to understand a phrase “self-interpreting animals” [Taylor 
1985, 45] as internally coherent we need either a biological definition of self-
interpretation or a culturalist definition of an animal. Contrariwise, we must 
either admit that culturally acquired ability to interpret oneself transfers 
human beings from the world of animals to the world of humans or 
acknowledge that we are simply animals and culture is a pure fiction. 
Analogous discrepancies appear in explanations of social and cultural 
phenomena offered by naturalists and anti-naturalists.  
First, it is worth remembering that there is a fundamental difference 
between naturalist (e.g., biological) and culturalist (e.g., sociological) 
explanations of cultural phenomena. If the naturalist concepts are used 
“substantially,” and not as metaphors or analogies, the naturalist 
explanations are conceptually heterogeneous: their explanandum are social 
(cultural) phenomena described in social (culturalist) terms, whereas their 
explanans are biological facts. The construction of such a heterogeneous 
explanation requires particular caution and care. When it is done without 
caution and care we face situation described by Fracchia and Lewontin: 
“Darwinian theorists of cultural evolution universally agree that selection is 
the explanatory law, the key to explaining all ‘evolutionary’ or ‘historical’ 
developments at any sociocultural and historical coordinates. In this way 
human history is reduced to a unitary process, its complex dynamics to a 
rather singular logic, and the particularity of historical time is reduced to  
‘empty abstract time’ (Walter Benjamin)” [Fracchia, Lewontin 1999, 59]. The 
blunt claim of Fracchia and Lewontin may be an exaggeration because 
evolutionary studies of culture have undergone a transition from simply 
applying evolutionary biology to formulating (mathematical) models of 
cultural evolution more or less analogues to the biological evolution or even 
models of co-evolution. Nevertheless, at the end some reference to biological 
concepts of selection, successful variants, adaptation or similar ones has to 
be made in those studies.  
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Second, there are no ultimately convincing arguments that 
evolutionary or co-evolutionary explanations are better that those given by 
the students of the humanities or social sciences in their own terms. They 
claim that to explain a social or cultural fact — as a fact of society or culture 
— is to discover social or cultural factors that determine, condition, or 
constitute it (make it what it is). The reason that justifies the anti-naturalist 
explanatory strategy is exactly the same as the reason that justifies 
a biological explanation of a biological phenomenon or a physical explanation 
of a physical phenomenon: explaining the physical phenomenon of free-fall, 
a physicist refers to physical factors and not to biological or psychological 
features of falling bodies, even if they are cats or suicides. So, like the 
physicist, the sociologist is entitled to construct a sociological explanation of 
sociological phenomenon and the cultural anthropologist — to give 
a culturalist explanation. We can even say that the construction of such 
explanations is their obligation. Moreover, it seems that there are human 
phenomena that cannot be explained by reference to genetic selection or 
other mechanisms described by evolutionary biology. Biological explanation 
cannot account for values and evaluative statements or substitute for 
a sociological explanation that refers “to inherently social rules and 
intentions” [Smith 2007, 29].6 In general, an adherent of sociological or 
anthropological approach to humans still can argue “that the understanding 
we seek about human subjects fundamentally, and irreducibly, concerns 
meaning, values, social rules and the expressive world made possible by 
language” [Ibidem, 110]. These phenomena cannot be reduced to the 
                                               
6 Jerzy Kmita argues that in order to explain, for instance, a connection between an act of the 
placing of a crown on one’s head and constituting this person as a monarch, it is simpler and 
more convincing to refer to cultural rules then to a physical causal explanation [Kmita 1995, 
221]. Similarly, Thomas Szasz states: “No one claims to be able to explain the economic or 
emotional value of a wedding ring by identifying its material composition; scientists do not 
insists that a physicalist account of its structure is superior to a cultural and personal account 
of its meaning” [Szasz 2008, 579]. 
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workings of human brain, to the biological processes of adaptation, or to the 
effects of the mechanism of genetic variation and natural selection.   
To clarify the second issue, i.e., the difference between explanation of 
human features and understanding who we are I would like to refer to the 
statement of Hubert Marki, an animal behaviorist, who says: “The question of 
why humans have developed a unique style of mental contents should be 
answered according to the usual paradigm of Darwinian evolutionary theory” 
[Marki 2008, 209]. His question is a clear example of a problem leading to 
that what I have called a genetic or genealogical explanation. It presupposes 
that “a unique style of mental contents” was developed or singled out from 
an evolutionary more primordial or more universal form of mental contents. 
It is quite understandable that while answering it one would refer to a 
scientific theory that refers to developmental processes in living beings and 
shows mechanisms that produce these processes. It is, however, a 
completely different matter to answer the question referring to human 
“unique style of mental content.” This means giving its definition or — as I 
prefer to formulate it — to understand it. Marki himself defines it not in 
biological, evolutionary terms, but in psychological ones. Moreover, it seems 
to me that he presupposes that these terms are able to grasp both the 
uniqueness of human mental contents and their historical, social, and cultural 
universality. The recognition of the presence of such presuppositions leads 
me to the third issue. 
No matter whether one talks about human nature that has its roots in 
the evolutionary process or about humanity understood in a humanist, social, 
anthropological, or philosophical terms, one has to do it on the ground of 
certain beliefs that are necessary, very often tacitly taken for granted, but by 
no means self-evident and ultimately justifiable. They become visible after 
some time or from a different perspective, and then they are often identified 
as prejudices, partial prejudgments, and their holders are accused of bigotry, 
unfairness, or plain stupidity.  
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Let us have a closer look at the presuppositions of any naturalist 
explanation of cultural phenomena. First of all, there is the epistemological 
assumption of scientism that knowledge of different scientific disciplines is 
compatible and can be unified. This presupposition is based on realism and 
cognitive objectivism. According to it, there are no historical, disciplinary, or 
paradigmatic gaps or breaks in knowledge that cannot be bridged. In other 
words, views of a given phenomenon established from different perspectives 
can be unified, and for every thing, process, or phenomenon there is one 
coherent truth.  
Only on the basis of this assumption can one claim that scientific 
studies in various historical epochs, in different disciplines, and under many 
paradigms refer to the same objects. Only on the basis of this assumption can 
one claim that conceptual diversity, the selective nature of scientific 
cognition, its historical situatedness, non-conclusive nature, and other factors 
do not limit the objectivity of scientific research, and are not sources of the 
insurmountable constructive nature of scientific research.  
On the ground of this assumption it is obvious that the Earth 
considered by Ptolemy is the Earth of Copernicus; that motion described by 
Einstein is exactly the same physical phenomenon as the one described 
earlier by Newton, Galileo, and Aristotle; and that — by analogy — the 
human being of sociology, cultural studies, or cultural anthropology is exactly 
the same as the human being of sociobiology, behavioral ecology, cultural 
evolution theory or a model of gene-culture co-evolution. Presupposing this, 
one can believe that, for instance, a sociobiological explanation of a social 
phenomenon and its sociological description compose a coherent whole.  
Another assumption of the naturalist strategy of reductionist 
unification (not accepted by the gene-culture co-evolution theory) is the idea 
of the asymmetry in the relation between the social and natural disciplines. 
They are not equivalent, they do not possess equal rights, and do not co-
explain social phenomena. From the naturalist perspective they cannot be 
equivalent because only the social is influenced and modified by the natural; 
 16 [BARBARA TUCHAŃSKA] 
 
the natural is not influenced and modified by the social. Thus, either 
sociology must be reduced to biology (as in the radical version of 
sociobiology) or — at least — recognized as not self-sufficient. Acceptance of 
the strategy of reductionist unification means for the social sciences and the 
humanities either self-destruction or fundamental self-limitation. 
The humanities are not, however, doomed to self-destruction or self-
limitation. As Leszek Kołakowski emphasizes [1984], the belief that biology 
gives us insight into biological processes as the reality from which the human 
originates, and in which it is grounded, may be an important heuristic 
principle, but it does not lead to a better answer to the question of who we 
are. 
 
3. Humanity not reduced to human nature 
 
Radically anti-naturalist approaches to humanity can be found in the 
contemporary interpretive and hermeneutic traditions in the humanities and 
philosophy. There are good reasons to claim that an important part of 
contemporary Continental philosophy is the philosophy of culture or — more 
precisely — culturalist philosophy [Siemek 1982, 54–55]. It is anti-reductionst 
in its articulation of the self-reflexive consciousness of modernity, which 
“knows itself as culture and as one among many.” The culturalist philosophy 
recognizes and makes modernity the world of culture, in a broad 
anthropological sense of the term, or, “as Hegel would say, defines it as the 
world-epoch of Bildung” [Markus 2011, 18]. Culture conceived in this way is 
“the outcome of the way the Enlightenment invented and defined itself” 
[Ibidem, 19]. Modern ways of live are not “simply natural, or God-ordained,” 
they are “man-made and re-makable” [Ibidem, 18]. 
It is true that from the perspective of a culturalist philosophy “to be 
modern is to have a human-centered view of the universe,” to recognize 
human beings “as the source of all meaning and value, the agents in all 
action, the eye in the storm of existence itself” [Nimmo 2011, 60], but 
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anthropocentrism does not entail a dualist view of culture as opposed to 
nature. Rather, the modern culturalist philosophy tries to go beyond the 
traditional epistemological subject/object dichotomy as well as beyond the 
culture/nature opposition. From its perspective culture is the primordial 
sphere in which all reality, objective and subjective, is constituted. 
We participate in a culture (and society), and the relation between us 
and cultural reality is not a form of objective causal determination. We are 
human beings as participants in historical cultural realities, and our humanity, 
both who and what we are, is culturally situated: we are cultural beings. 
Thus, the objectivist belief that cultural reality can be studied from outside, 
as an object independent from us, is illusory because any attempt to establish 
the subject/object opposition between ourselves and our culture is itself a 
cultural act. When we undertake a study of culture we always and already 
participate in it. 
In this tradition the problem of humanity ceases to be a metaphysical 
problem of human nature that preexists human being (existence) and awaits 
actualization, or a scientific question of what differs human species from 
other species. It becomes an existential-ethical question. As it is rightly 
emphasized by Stefan Amsterdamski: the concept of humanity “is not a 
zoological but a moral concept” [Amsterdamski 1994, 25].  
From this perspective, humanity is projected and constituted by us in 
the course of our transcending beyond what has been established so far by us 
and our ancestors toward what is not yet present. In other words, from the 
existentialist perspective humanity is neither an essence nor a fact of a more 
primordial status than our being. It does not exist by itself. It is the content of 
our acts of overcoming ourselves as we are at the moment as well as acts of 
going beyond the existing order and projecting the future. From the 
existentialist perspective, the existing order is the reality of depersonifying 
objective determination, and while going beyond it, we direct ourselves 
toward Transcendence, even if it is nothingness. 
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Also all interpretive trends in contemporary sociology, such as 
symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, or constructivism, carry an anti-
naturalist view of humanity. They concentrate on social interactions or on 
everyday life and emphasize the we constitute ourselves through mutual 
interpretations and re-interpretations. Radical adherents of the sociology of 
everyday life interactions reject any need for establishing an objectifying 
distance between themselves as sociologists and the social reality, in which 
they take part as members of a society and participants in interactions of 
everyday life. Even if their research project cannot be realized, the 
interpretive perspective should not be ignored.  
Philosophy of culture and the interpretive tradition in the social 
sciences contribute to the decline of scientism as well as to the demise of its 
beliefs: that scientific method is historically, disciplinary, and paradigmatically 
universal, and that scientific cognition is applicable to everything that exists 
and can be known and. Moreover, it seems that we witness not just an act of 
destroying a particular, local form of scientism but the process of the 
devastation of the entire scientistic ideology.7 
 
4. Who are we? 
 
Undoubtedly, to answer the question of who we are is not a simple 
matter. I believe that there is insight in the philosophical position that does 
not locate humanity in the uniqueness of the human species, in the 
unsurpassed sensitivity of human beings, or even in human consciousness but 
in self-consciousness. It is very possible that no single feature or ability 
distinguishes humans from animals, but their combination certainly does, and 
self-consciousness is in the core of that combination. Only a human being can 
become an object for himself or herself; only a human being can refer to the 
                                               
7 There is, of course, an opposite trend, namely post-humanistic naturalism. Its anti-
anthropocentrism is, however, equally illusory as that of traditional naturalism. 
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world and — moreover — to his/her own referring to the world; only 
a human being can have the consciousness of being conscious. “It is not the 
fact that we are feeling and sensitive subjects that distinguishes us among 
living creatures, but the fact that we can be objects for ourselves, that is, be 
capable of splitting our consciousness so that it becomes its own observer” 
[Kołakowski 1989, 115].  
What needs emphasizing at this point is the fact that our capability of 
“splitting our consciousness so that it becomes its own observer” is an ability 
exercised by individuals but it is socially and culturally created. Moreover, it is 
not only socially created, it does not exists without language, social relations, 
and cultural rules; it is social and cultural in the sense that self-referring is our 
communal activity. Self-consciousness is but an element of our self-referring 
practice. We do different things to our bodies, we self-train and self-disciple 
ourselves. 
The view that conscious self-referring is constitutive for humanity has 
important consequences. It allows us to see that naturalist conceptions of 
humanity discovering objectively our real immersion in nature, fundamental 
for who/what we are, cannot illuminate our self-consciousness. They allow us 
to identify ourselves with nature in our reflection on ourselves but they have 
no conceptual tools at their disposal to naturalize our reflection on our 
reflection. When we self-reflectively refer to our own consciousness we 
cannot identify ourselves with any natural phenomenon; the ability of our 
thinking to reflect upon itself appears to us as radically different from the 
natural and the animal. Moreover, it is our self-reflection that is the condition 
of our objectifying view of nature, ourselves, and our own being in the world. 
“The awareness of one’s being in the world itself therefore transcends the 
being in the world, and is an irreversible abandonment of the spontaneous 
consent to its natural position; it is the irreversible loss of a ready-made 
location in nature.” [Ibidem, 116] In other words, human subjectivity that 
divides itself into the reflecting subject and the subject matter of self-
reflection, self-experience, ceases to be part of nature. Even if I conceive 
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human consciousness as an element of nature, I — as a subject performing 
this understanding — am not within nature; otherwise I would not be able to 
treat nature as an object of my cognition and conceive my cognition as 
different from me myself who is its subject.  
Consequently, any biological characteristics that can be an element of 
my self-experience is no longer simply and purely natural; it requires 
understanding [Ibidem, 116]. To the extent to which humanity consists in 
self-consciousness we do not belong to nature but stick our heads out of it; 
and our self-consciousness cannot be reduced to what we know about 
ourselves as natural beings. “Even if we did know precisely who we are in 
nature, we would be unable to cease knowing that we know — and this state 
of duality is enough to prevent our being completely integrated into the 
order of nature” [Ibidem, 115–116]. My being-within-nature and my being-
within-nature-knowing-that-I-am-within-nature are two radically different 
ontological situations. The second, exclusively human, situation is — in fact — 
even more complicated because it contains an element of self-awareness. 
Thus, my being means that I-am-within-nature-knowing-that-I-know-that-I-
am-within-nature. 
The fact that we are not humans on the basis of the differentiam 
specificam of the species Homo sapiens but — in a nutshell — by our own 
self-referential making does not lead to any of presuppostions usually 
attributed to anthropocentrism. One is the claim to human superiority, the 
other — dualistic ontology.  
Anthropocentrism is often characterized not only as a position 
stressing “human centredness” but also “as the view that humanity has been 
conditioned to regard itself as a superior species” [Jonge 2011, 307]. The 
belief in human superiority is “deeply rooted in the Judaeo-Christian tradition 
of domination” and — possibly — in the “worldview of technocratic-
industrialised societies” (Ibidem, 308). However, none of those “paradigms of 
domination” is an unavoidable element of anthropocentrism, and I do not 
feel compelled to accept the claim to human superiority.  
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The dualist ontology is a result of human experience that can 
accompany the self-reflective recognition of human uniqueness. It “presents 
the world as precisely that which I am not, as a phenomenon which is 
primarily characterized by its inability to absorb my existence; it is therefore 
characterized as otherness, indifference, and passivity” [Kołakowski 1989, 
117]. However, no matter how keen this experience is, it should not be 
turned into the basis for a philosophical position. Instead of ontological 
dualism let me outline a monistic view that recognizes its own limitations.  
 
5. Mythical foundations of naturalism and anti-naturalism  
  
If humanity is not simply a form of animality, if it constitutes itself in 
the sphere of culture, the biological order remains outside the horizon within 
which the human is established, and it is impossible to cross over this 
horizon, no matter whether the attempt is made from inside or from outside: 
any horizon moves together with the voyager. Thus, for the humanities, 
encircled within the horizon of the human, the natural and biological appear 
as unknown conditions of what is its subject matter. These conditions are 
necessary and a priori because the humanities can neither deny the existence 
of nature nor offer positive knowledge of it. On the other hand, for the 
natural (biological) sciences, the human appears as alienated from nature 
and, thus, unknowable for them, i.e., located outside their horizon. 
Moreover, since natural scientists cannot deny — without violating their own 
self-experience — that their ability for self-reflection confirms the fact that 
they protrude beyond nature, the human is for the natural sciences also a 
condition. It is a necessary condition of their existence: they are products of 
cognitive acts of humans.  
The idea that both the human and the natural sciences are within 
their own horizons allows us to realize that the choice between the naturalist 
and anti-naturalist answers to the question of human nature is a mythical 
option in the sense that any of them is based on certain beliefs that are 
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neither empirically verifiable nor deductively demonstrable. They are prior to 
any empirical or deductive procedures, and must be accepted per fiat, which 
means — simply — that they are inherited from tradition and very often not 
even recognized or articulated. To characterize both approaches to human 
nature as mythical options is not — in my intention — pejorative, but purely 
descriptive. It means to reveal their axiological foundations because “all 
reasons in which the mythical consciousness is rooted, both in its initial 
variant, and in its metaphyscial extensions, are acts of affirming values” 
[Ibidem, 5]. Myths perform both cognitive and social roles. And — as 
Kołakowski puts it — “both the bond-creating role of myth in communal life 
and its integrational functions in organizing personal consciousness, appear 
irreplaceable”; in particular, they cannot be replaced by “beliefs regulated by 
the criteria of scientific knowledge” [Ibidem, 118]. I understand, however, 
that the claim that scientific answer to the question of what we are is based 
on a myth, namely the myth of Science, requires further careful clarification 
because it must seem completely unjustified to the adherents of the 
naturalist approach, who believe that scientism (and naturalism) means the 
rejection of all myths. In fact, it means specifically the abandonment of the 
myth of Reason and consequently the myth of Man. 
The myth of Man allows people to understand their reference to the 
Transcendence, and to view themselves as supernatural, spiritual beings. It 
soothes human feeling of the indifference of nature and shows both the 
human and the natural as rooted within the ideal (divine) order. It reassures 
human beings that their position in the universe is exceptional, that they are 
superior to other living creatures. The myth of Reason supplements the myth 
of Man because it gives people the certitude that the order of ideas or of 
God’s plans and commands can be known by men. It gives people certainty 
that they can unite with a deity through mythical rituals, mystical experience, 
or intellectual intuition.8 
                                               
8 I discuss these myths more broadly in [Tuchańska 1995]. 
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Scientism, as an ideology of (empirical) scientific research, not only 
rejects the possibility of unity with a deity and its mystical experiencing, but it 
also abandons the nativist and intuitionist conceptions of traditional 
rationalism. Thus, there is a fundamental clash between the myths of Man 
and Reason and scientism, in general, and naturalist view of humanity, in 
particular. These myths do not allow us to accept and justify science’s claim 
to ultimate descriptive and explanatory truth. Scientism, on the other hand, 
states that there are no limits to scientific cognition, but it is — by definition 
— the cognition of phenomena accessible to scientific research that is 
empirical and theoretical. Therefore, it is specific and to be distinguished 
from the metaphysical, the speculative, the religious, or the mystical. Even 
the weakest versions of the criterion of demarcation between science and 
non-science (e.g., metaphysics) implies that ideas, which cannot be 
empirically tested or deductively proved, are not acceptable in the sphere of 
knowledge per se. This is, in a nutshell, the content of the myth of Science.  
From the perspective of the myth of Science, there is no place for the 
myth of Man within the sphere of knowledge: man must be reduced to an 
empirical, natural phenomena that can be studied by the natural sciences and 
by the humanities, if they use scientific procedures. For scientism, the most 
radical (and the simplest) way of solving the conflict between it and the 
myths of Man and Reason is to eliminate both myths. A less radical solution is 
to claim that the myth of Man may be present, as necessary or useful, in the 
sphere of religion, metaphysics, or everyday life, but not in the scientific 
study of human nature: the scientific knowledge of man can and should be 
free from myths. In other words, the claim of the naturalist approach to 
human beings is that scientific cognition has the right to reduce humanity to 
a phenomenon that is accessible through its empirical-theoretical 
procedures.  
There are, however, few fundamental difficulties connected with the 
scientistic belief that neither the myth of Man nor the myth of Reason is 
necessary for our self-understanding. Let me mention two of them. First, the 
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scientific view of humanity is doomed to inconsistency with human self-
experience that contains a view of ourselves as supernatural beings and 
a view of the world as unable to absorb our existence; views that are revived 
again and again in human history. Second, the naturalist view cannot absorb 
human ethical-experience.9 Lorenz is right when he states that the 
behaviorist concept of full plasticity of the human personality that is entirely 
shaped by social influences grants dispensation from individual moral 
obligations; but an opposite view of human activity governed by biological 
instincts and impulses also grants moral irresponsibility. The evolutionary 
ontology of Lorenz, who stresses the innate biological abilities of human 
beings, is as doubtful a foundation of the “civilizational concern” referring to 
cultural regress as is behaviorism, which he criticizes. The value of ethological 
or sociobiological programs of the moral restoration of the humankind 
depends on the ontological limitation of the biological determination of 
human praxis. Without such limitation there would be no opening within 
which non-biological phenomena, such as human self-consciousness, 
responsible reason, conscience, or moral values, could appear. Without the 
myth of Man the civilizational concern, so vivid in the work of both Lorenz 
and Wilson, is groundless. In fact, both Lorenz and Wilson appeal to our 
Reason, which they do not identify with a function and activity of our brain; 
and they do it in the name of moral values, which they do not reduce to the 
survival of human genes.  
If I am right that scientism is unavoidably incommensurable with the 
myths of Man and Reason, the decline of scientism may mean either the 
restitution of both myths or the elaboration of a new philosophical position.  
It seems that Bruno Latour and the adherents of his actor-network-
theory believe this is a post-humanist sociology of associations that avoids 
disadvantages and contradictions of both scientism and humanism 
                                               
9 Any possible concept of moral responsibility as a purely biological phenomenon seems to 
be even a greater misunderstanding than the sociobiological concept of aggression. 
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(anthropocentrism). He may be right in claiming that it overcomes difficulties 
that he has pointed out, in particular a tendency present in both approaches 
to consider their own explanation as final or an inclination of social theorist 
to reify the social. However, this does not mean that an actor-network-theory 
does not generate its own troubles. It seems anthropomorphic and it is not 
myth free. Its radical anthropomorphism is visible in statements like this one: 
“In addition to ‘determining’ and serving as a ‘back-drop for human action’, 
things might authorize, allow, afford, encourage, permit, suggest, influence, 
block, render possible, forbid, and so on” [Latour 2005, 72]. The meanings of 
human actions are extended here to non-human actors. Such a move is not 
in-itself impossible or contradictory. It seems, however, to be a case of 
anthropocentrism and it requires careful conceptual analysis, similar to the 
one that is necessary in the case of the biological use of humanist categories. 
Even if adherents of the actor-network-theory accept — like Nik Taylor [2011, 
266–267] — an anthropomorphic way of explaining non-humans, exposing 
themselves to Latour’s accusation of anthropocentrism, they still need to 
clarify what does it mean, for instance, that a thing forbids an event? Does it 
refer to a procedural rule, like a technician who forbids us to do certain things 
to our car, to a social custom, like a mother commanding a child not to 
behave in a certain way, to a moral norm, or a religious command, or does it 
simply cause an opposite event?  
As an attempt to overcome the subject/object opposition, to describe 
non-human action in an exactly the same way as activity of human actors, 
and to see all traditional (metaphysical) divisions as artifacts the actor-
network-theory is based on some mythical beliefs. First, it is a belief in 
homogeneous reality in which the nature/culture divide is not constitutive 
but completely spurious, and second, an equally mythical belief that we can 
cognize the world without using oppositions.     
One of the oppositions that seem unavoidable to me is the distinction 
between human and non-human participants in networks of interrelations 
and events. We cannot ignore the fact that we build our own (individual or 
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communal) self-consciousness and we cannot build something else’s self-
consciousness. We should not disregard the fact that it is us who use either 
objectifying or anthropomorphic descriptions. Does it make us superior to 
non-human actants? By any means! But it makes us different, and no matter 
how we describe and explain us or them and how we conceive the difference 
between us and them all those acts are our acts. We can no more separate 
ourselves from these acts than we can dissociate them from us. Similarly, we 
can act ethically not only toward other humans but also toward non-humans. 
However, we rather shouldn’t expect that a scorpion whom we didn’t kill for 
ethical reasons will act ethically in revenge.  
I believe that nature/culture conundrum can be tackled differently. I 
believe that it is possible to construct a philosophical position that would 
contain a less universalist view of science, a different ideal of scientific 
cognition, and would be free from dreams of superiority haunting both 
ideologies: a scientistic and anthropocentric one. It would be — naturally — 
based on another myth, namely, the myth of human (historical) self-





If there are always certain mythical options at the origin of our self-
understanding, e.g., the myth of Man and the myth of Reason, or the myth of 
Science, or the myth of human self-constitution, the historical separation of 
the scientific (naturalist) question of what is man (as a natural being) from 
the metaphysical issue of humanity and the existentialist-ethical problem of 
who we should become is spurious. Essentially they are still united. There is, 
of course, a fundamental difference between asking what are we, and asking 
who are we, but the view of myself as simply “a thing among things” or “an 
                                               
10 The search for such a position was continued in [McGuire, Tuchańska 2000]. 
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automaton in disguise” is equally illusory as the view of myself as “pure self-
consciousness.” The search for what we are is objectified: we treat ourselves 
as objects, the search for who we are is personalized: we treat ourselves as 
persons.  
The answer to the question: Who are we? requires engaging in the act 
of self-consciousness and conceiving self-consciousness as constitutive for 
humanity. In other words, it requires the transition from being to 
intentionality: it is not our being and features of ourselves as beings that 
constitute our human nature, but our intentionality and — in particular — 
the fact that we are aware of our intentionality. And it is intentionality that 
separates us from animals and escapes an analysis in naturalist terms. 
However, the fact that we cannot know who we are without engaging in the 
acts of self-understanding does not turn us into pure thinking substances; we 
are more than we think (about ourselves) and know.  
As distancing ourselves from the world is the necessary condition of 
any act of thinking-about-the-world, so to see the world as separated from 
ourselves is the necessary condition of any act of our self-understanding. If 
we agree that — contrary to radical naturalism — we are not constituted as 
humans within nature, we still have to realize that without the establishment 
of the world as the frame of reference for us, we would not be able to see 
ourselves in non-naturalist terms. And it is of secondary importance whether 
we understand the world as a home in which we dwell or as a natural system 
which determines us. However, the act of the separation of ourselves from 
the world neither discovers the absolute priority of the world nor constitutes 
it as an unavoidable conclusion. The belief in absolute priority of the world 
over us is a proposition inferred within the myth of Science and based on the 
neglect of the fact that this world is not just a world-existing-by-itself, it is 
always and already our world, the world of human experience and practice. 
Hence, theoretically it is possible to claim that we are constituted as humans 
partially within nature and partially within culture; the obstacle to such an 
integrated view is, however, the inability to understand this contribution of 
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nature and culture as equal on the ground of present science. This is why I 
opt for a third position: we are constituted as humans within culture. Only 
this position allows us to understand our own self-constitution and, in 
particular, our self-reflectivity, as well as the naturalist attempts to ignore 
them and immerse ourselves in nature. 
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